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Hepatitis, AIDS and the Blood Product Exemption
from Strict Products Liability in California:
A Reassessment
According to California Health & Safety Code section 1606, suppli-
ers of blood and blood products provide a service, not a sale, "for all
purposes whatsoever."' Traditionally, courts have interpreted section
1606 to preclude strict products liability actions against hospitals, blood
banks, and blood products manufacturers2 in cases involving hepatitis-
contaminated blood. The statute is under new scrutiny, however. Since
the discovery of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome ("AIDS"),3 a
new line of cases has arisen in which plaintiffs who contracted the disease
from blood transfusions and blood products have challenged California
courts' traditional interpretation of section 1606. Whether the statute
will continue to preclude strict liability actions in the context of AIDS
contamination is uncertain; only one case has reached a California appel-
late court.4 Due to the devastating impact of AIDS on its victims, how-
ever, the time has come to reevaluate whether immunizing suppliers of
transfusible blood and blood products from strict liability furthers the
policies underlying the doctrine.
This Note reexamines the background of section 1606 and of the
public policy rationales underlying strict liability and concludes that sup-
pliers of transfusible blood, such as hospitals and blood banks, should
continue to be exempt from strict products liability in all contamination
cases. For purposes of this Note, "transfusible blood" means whole
blood or plasma that is always professionally administered, usually in a
hospital or other medical facility. Transfusible blood is not self-adminis-
trable and is not sold to consumers for home use; thus, it is not placed
into the general stream of commerce. To the extent that other entities
1. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1606 (West 1979) provides in full:
The procurement, processing, distribution, or use of whole blood, plasma, blood
products, and blood derivatives for the purpose of injecting or transfusing the same,
or any of them, into the human body shall be construed to be, and is declared to be,
for all purposes whatsoever, the rendition of a service by each and every person, firm,
or corporation participating therein, and shall not be construed to be, and is declared
not to be, a sale of such whole blood, plasma, blood products, or blood derivatives,
for any purpose or purposes whatsoever.
2. See infra notes 55-57 & accompanying text.
3. See infra note 103 & accompanying text for a description of the disease.
4. Hyland Therapeutics v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. App. 3d 509, 220 Cal. Rptr. 590
(1985), rev'g Gallagher v. Cutter Laboratories, Inc., No. 548947 (Santa Clara Super. Ct. filed
May 11, 1984).
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supply transfusible blood exclusively to medical facilities, they also
should continue to be exempt from strict liability.
This Note proposes, however, that immunity from strict liability
should not extend to manufacturers of blood products. The term "blood
products" is used here to refer to blood-derivative products that can be
self-administered and that are placed directly into the stream of com-
merce for purchase and use by individual consumers. The only blood
products currently manufactured are coagulants, or blood-clotting
agents, used in the treatment of hemophilia; however, other blood-de-
rived products with other uses probably will emerge in the future.
Section 1606 mischaracterizes the manufacture and sale of blood
products as a "service." Blood products manufacturers, unlike hospitals
or blood banks, conduct "normal commercial transactions ' 5 to which
strict liability rationales apply; those manufacturers should be subject to
strict liability actions to the same extent as other commercial manufac-
turers. While strict liability should apply to blood products manufactur-
ers in all contamination cases, including hepatitis, application of strict
liability is even more important in AIDS cases because of the severity of
that disease. 6 Accordingly, section 1606 should be amended to eliminate
strict liability protection for blood products manufacturers.
This Note first examines the present doctrine of strict products lia-
bility in tort under California law. In particular, it analyzes the history
of the blood product exemption, stemming from cases involving hepatitis
contamination. As a preface to a discussion of the cases involving AIDS-
contaminated blood, the Note compares hepatitis and AIDS to reveal
why courts have analyzed those cases in a parallel fashion. The Note
then contrasts AIDS and hepatitis, disclosing the medical differences that
weaken the precedential value of hepatitis cases in determining liability
in the AIDS context. Next, the Note focuses on California courts' dispo-
sition of strict liability actions in cases involving AIDS-contaminated
blood. The Note then demonstrates that, in the context of both hepatitis
and AIDS contamination, strict liability should apply to blood products
manufacturers but should not be imposed upon hospitals and blood
banks. Finally, the Note proposes that section 1606 be amended to clar-
ify and narrow that statute's application to strict liability actions and
establishes that such an amendment would be constitutional.
5. Magrine v. Krasnica, 94 N.J. Super. 228, 235, 227 A.2d 539, 543 (1967) ("(T]he
essence of [such a] transaction ... relates to the article sold. The seller is in the business of
supplying the product to the consumer. It is that, and that alone, for which he is paid.")
(emphasis in original), ajffd sub nom., Magrine v. Spector, 100 N.J. Super. 223, 241 A.2d 637
(1968); see infra note 63 & accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 103, 115-18 & accompanying text.
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The California Doctrine of Strict Products Liability in Tort
In 1963, the California Supreme Court formulated the doctrine of
strict products liability in tort in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,7 a
case involving a defective lathe attachment that flew off and hit the plain-
tiff in the head. Until Greenman, California courts, as well as courts in
other states, had relied on an implied warranty theory to impose strict
liability for damage to persons and property caused by defective prod-
ucts.8 Because of its connection to contract and sales law, however, the
implied warranty theory was not suited to tort actions arising from per-
sonal injuries sustained by a user of the product who had no contractual
relationship with the seller.9 "[Courts were forced to resort to rather
transparent devices" 10 to sidestep warranty requirements imposed by the
law of sales. To eliminate such judicial contortions, the Greenman court
established an alternative theory of recovery based on tort law. 1 Under
this theory, "[a] manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he
places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for
defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being." 12
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts ("Restate-
ment"),1 3 published two years after Greenman, included a standard very
similar to that presented in Greenman, but imposed the additional re-
quirement that the defective condition render the product "unreasonably
7. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
8. Greenman, 59 Cal. 2d at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701; Cronin v. J.B.E.
Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 129, 501 P.2d 1153, 1159, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 439 (1972); see also
W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 690-92 (5th ed.
1984) (explaining the evolution of the theory of implied warranty); Traynor, The Ways and
Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363, 365 (1965).
9. "However well warranty served in the field of commercial transactions, its invocation
in torts to rationalize compensation for injury also served to frustrate it." Traynor, supra note
8, at 365.
[lit was apparent that a movement was in progress to impose a kind of strict liability
(1) without proof of negligence, (2) without manifestation of intent to guarantee, (3)
without the requirement of privity of contract as a prerequisite to recovery, and (4)
without recognizing the validity of contractual disclaimers of liability.
W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 8, at 692.
10. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 8, at 691. For example, some courts held
that long-delayed claims satisfied statutory notice requirements, or construed the requirements
as inapplicable to personal injury claims. Id.
11. Greenman, 59 Cal. 2d at 62-63, 377 P.2d at 900-01, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700-01.
12. Id. at 62, 373 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
13. Section 402A states:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
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dangerous" to the user or consumer. 14 For several years, California
courts used both the Greenman and the Restatement standards in tan-
dem in strict liability cases.15
In 1972, however, the California Supreme Court expressly rejected
the Restatement's additional requirement. In Cronin v. JB.E. Olson
Corp, 16 the court held that the Restatement imposed a greater burden on
plaintiffs than the Greenman court had intended. 17 The court found that
the words "unreasonably dangerous" required proof of an element
"which rings of negligence." 1 8 The court reasoned that this was inconsis-
tent with the basis for strict products liability, which had developed
largely to relieve plaintiffs from problems of proof inherent in negligence
actions. 19 Thus, Cronin established that a plaintiff need not prove that a
defective condition was unreasonably dangerous, but merely that the
product had a defect, existing at the time it left the manufacturer, which
proximately caused his injuries. 20 Cronin also established that strict lia-
bility can arise from a defect in a product's manufacture or design,2 1 but
the court declined to offer a legal definition of "defect."
A definition of "defect" emerged six years after Cronin in Barker v.
Lull Engineering Co., 22 a strict products liability suit involving a defec-
tive design. 23 The Barker court recognized that, while the meaning of
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
14. The term "unreasonably dangerous" is defined as "dangerous to an extent beyond
that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordi-
nary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics." Id. comment i.
15. See Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 131, 501 P.2d 1153, 1160-61, 104
Cal. Rptr. 433, 440-41 (1972).
16. 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972). In Cronin, plaintiff was
hurled through the windshield of his delivery truck when an aluminum safety hasp failed in a
collision, forcing bread trays in the rear of the truck to lurch forward.
17. Id. at 134-35, 501 P.2d at 1162-63, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442-43.
18. Id. at 132, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
19. Id. at 129-35, 501 P.2d at 1159-62, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 439-43.
20. Id. at 123, 501 P.2d at 1159, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 435.
21. "A defect may emerge from the mind of the designer as well as from the hand of the
workman." Id. at 134, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442. The court affirmed the appli-
cation of the Greenman doctrine to both types of defects. Id. A manufacturing defect arises
from an inadvertent mistake in production, while a design defect is a problem inherent in the
plan or makeup of a product.
22. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
23. The plaintiff in Barker was struck and injured by falling lumber when he jumped
from a high-lift loader which began to vibrate and tip during the course of operation. He
alleged that the absence of various safety equipment resulted in a design defect that caused his
injuries. Id. at 419-20, 573 P.2d at 447, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 229.
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the term "defect" required little elaboration as applied to manufacturing
mistakes, such as "when one machine in a million contains a cracked or
broken part,"2 4 cases involving design defects posed more difficult
problems of definition.2 5 The court explicitly set forth two alternative
tests for establishing a "design" defect. First, a product is defective in
design if it "failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would
expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner."
26
Alternatively, there is a design defect "if the plaintiff proves that the
product's design proximately caused his injury and the defendant fails to
prove [that] the benefits of the challenged design outweigh the risk of
danger inherent in such design."12 7 The court listed the factors to con-
sider in the latter risk-benefit analysis: the gravity of the potential dan-
ger; the likelihood danger will occur; the mechanical feasibility of a safer,
alternative design; the financial cost of an improved design; and the ad-
verse consequences to the product and the consumer resulting from the
alternative design.28
The greatest significance of the Barker risk-benefit test for design
defects is that it shifts the burden of proof to the manufacturer. Unlike
the negligence standard, under which the plaintiff bears the burden of
proving both that the manufacturer deviated from the standard of care
and that the resulting defect caused the injuries,2 9 the strict liability stan-
dard requires only that a plaintiff make a prima facie showing that the
product's design proximately caused his injury. Once the plaintiff meets
24. Id. at 417, 573 P.2d at 446, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 228.
25. Id. at 418, 573 P.2d at 446, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 228.
26. Id. at 435, 573 P.2d at 457, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 239. Professor Keeton calls this the
"consumer-contemplation" test. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 8, at 702.
27. Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 435, 573 P.2d at 457-58, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 239-40.
28. Id. at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237. The Barker court emphasized that
risks and benefits are to be analyzed in hindsight. "[A] product may be found defective.., if
through hindsight the jury... finds that the risk of danger inherent in the challenged design
outweighs the benefits of such design." Id. at 430, 573 P.2d at 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 236.
Further, "that the manufacturer... acted as a reasonably prudent manufacturer would have
under the circumstances, while perhaps absolving [him] of liability under a negligence theory,
will not preclude... strict liability.., if, upon hindsight, the trier of fact concludes that the
product's design is unsafe to consumers, users or bystanders." Id. at 434, 573 P.2d at 457, 143
Cal. Rptr. at 239. This discussion of "hindsight" raises the question of whether jurors are to
evaluate a challenged design in light of state-of-the-art technology existing at the time of trial.
See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 8, at 700-02. Despite its emphasis on the hind-
sight approach, the Barker court expressly reserved judgment on an unchallenged portion of
the jury instructions directing jurors to consider the state of the art at the time of design.
Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 422 n.4, 573 P.2d at 449 n.4, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 231 n.4. Consequently, it
remains unclear exactly how a hindsight analysis is to be applied in California, if at all. For a
general discussion of the California courts' struggle to define and apply the strict products
liability standard, see Diamond, Eliminating the "'Defect" in Design Strict Products Liability
Theory, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 529 (1983).
29. See Frantz v. San Luis Medical Clinic, 81 Cal. App. 3d 34, 39, 146 Cal. Rptr. 146,
150 (1978).
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this burden of going forward, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove
that the product was not defective.30 Shifting the burden of proof shifts
the focus of the lawsuit as well. The reasonableness of the manufac-
turer's conduct, which is the focus of a negligence action, is irrelevant
under strict liability, which instead centers on the adequacy of the prod-
uct3' under an objective risk-benefit test. This shift emphasizes the pol-
icy goals of strict liability discussed in the following section.
Rationales for Strict Products Liability
Four primary public policy rationales support holding manufactur-
ers strictly liable for defective products. First, strict liability is a means
of relieving plaintiffs from the problems of proving negligence in product
defect cases. 32 Proving negligence often is difficult for plaintiffs because
manufacturers control both the design and the production processes. 33
In addition, procedures for the design and manufacture of a product can
be highly complex and technical. While the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
allows an inference of negligence when no specific negligent act is
proved,34 that doctrine "seldom [has been] applied against a manufac-
turer because of the necessity of indulging two or more inferences. ' 35
Because of these difficulties, the trend has been to shift the legal focus
from the fault of the tortfeasor-the essence of a negligence action-to
the safety of the individual who is harmed. 36
The second rationale for the imposition of strict liability is that it
serves as an incentive to manufacturers to improve product safety.3 7 As
Justice Traynor stated:
Even if there is no negligence ... public policy demands that responsi-
30. Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
31. Id. at 432, 573 P.2d at 456, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 238.
32. Id. at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 239; Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8
Cal. 3d 121, 133, 501 P.2d 1153, 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 442 (1972); W. PROSSER & W.
KEETON, supra note 8, at 693; Franklin, Tort Liability for Hepatitis: An Analysis and a Propo-
sal, 24 STAN. L. REV. 439, 461 (1972).
33. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462-63, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944)
(Traynor, J., concurring).
34. "The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur permits negligence to be inferred from certain cir-
cumstances in which it is more likely than not that the injury resulted from negligent behavior,
but no direct evidence of negligence can be produced." Diamond, supra note 28, at 532 n. 12.
35. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 8, at 695.
36. Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 435, 573 P.2d at 457, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 239; Keeton, Product
Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30, 33 (1973); see also Traynor, supra
note 8, at 364 (the concern for product safety led first to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,
whereby the existence of a defect would permit an inference of negligence, then to the courts'
trend of imposing liability without negligence).
37. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 8, at 693; Franklin, supra note 32, at 462;
Note, Strict Liability-The Medical Service Immunity and Blood Transfusions in California, 7
U.C.D. L. REV. 196, 200-01 (1974).
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bility be fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce the hazards to
life and health inherent in defective products that reach the market. It
is evident that the manufacturer can anticipate some hazards and
guard against the recurrence of others, as the public cannot.38
Since manufacturers control both the design and production processes,
they are in a better position than the public to develop and employ safer
alternatives in the design and manufacture of their products.39
The third rationale for strict products liability is risk-spreading. 40
Under this rationale, the manufacturer producing a defective product
should bear the cost of resulting injuries because it can spread the finan-
cial burden of accidents among all purchasing consumers through the
product's price.41 Rather than imposing the financial burden on the oc-
casional victim, the insurance costs, more expensive production tech-
niques, and other related expenses are passed on as a cost of doing
business and ultimately are borne by all who purchase the product.
The fourth rationale underlying strict products liability is resource
allocation, which is based on the notion that the price of a product
should reflect not only its production cost, but also its cost to society. 42
This theory of "resource allocation" encourages individuals to consider
"accident costs"' 43 when choosing among two or more products that "can
substitute for one another to some significant extent." 44 Professor Cala-
bresi explains that
as long as individuals are adequately informed about the alternatives
and as long as the cost to society of giving them what they want is
reflected in the cost to the individual, the individual can decide better
than anyone else what he wants.... Some people who would engage in
[buying] a relatively dangerous [product] at prices that did not reflect
its accident costs will shift to a safer [product] if accident costs are
reflected in prices. The degree of the shift will depend on the relative
difference in accident costs and on how good a substitute the safer
[product] is.4 5
38. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 440-41 (1944)
(Traynor, J., concurring).
39. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supta note 8, at 693; Franklin, supra note 32, at 462.
40. Risk-spreading has been called "a fairness and justice reason of policy." W. PROSSER
& W. KEETON, supra note 8, at 693; see Franklin, supra note 32, at 463; Note, supra note 37,
at 200.
41. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 8, at 693; Franklin, supra note 32, at 463-
64.
42. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 440-41 (1944);
G. CALABRESI, THE COST OF AccIDENTs 70-73 (1970); see also Calabresi, Transaction Costs,
Resource Allocation and Liability Rules-A Comment, 11 J. LAW & ECON. 67 (1968); Frank-
lin, supra note 32, at 463; Note, supra note 37, at 201.
43. "Accident costs" can include increased liability or insurance premiums for a riskier
product and "accident avoidance" costs, such as the cost of preventive safety measures to
make a dangerous product safer. G. CALABRESI, supra note 42, at 73-74.
44. Id. at 83.
45. Id. at 70, 73.
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In summary, manufacturers' strict liability for injuries resulting
from defective products is justified as an easier road to recovery where
negligence may be present but difficult to prove, an incentive to improve
product safety, an equitable way to spread the economic risk of loss
among all who use a product, and a way to induce allocation of con-
sumer resources toward safer products.4 6 In cases in which most or all of
these rationales are inapplicable, courts decline to impose strict
liability. 47
The Blood Product Exemption from Strict Liability
Emergence of a Common-Law Exemption: Pernutter v. Beth David Hospital
Transfusible blood was first exempted from strict products liability
in Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital,48 a 1954 New York case. At that
time, strict liability was premised on an implied warranty theory, gov-
erned by contract and sales law, which required privity, and was predi-
cated upon the "sale" of a defective product.49
The plaintiff in Perlmutter sued the defendant hospital after con-
tracting hepatitis from a blood transfusion. She sought recovery on a
warranty theory, claiming that the hospital "sold" her the contaminated
blood for separate consideration. The hospital moved to dismiss her
complaint on the ground that the transaction did not constitute a sale.
The New York Supreme Court denied the motion and its appellate divi-
sion affirmed. 50
In reversing the lower court, the New York Court of Appeals held
that the furnishing of blood was not a "sale" because it was merely inci-
dental to the hospital's service of care and healing and thus was an inte-
gral and indivisible part of that service.5' Once the court characterized
46. McDonald v. Sacramento Medical Found. Blood Bank, 62 Cal. App. 3d 866, 874,
133 Cal. Rptr. 444, 448 (1976).
47. Id. (reasoning that one applicable rationale is not enough to justify the imposition of
strict liability).
48. 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954).
49. In 1954, the doctrine of strict liability in tort had not yet been developed. See supra
note 8 & accompanying text. Some commentators, however, have suggested that the court in
Perlmutter could have found implied warranties in the transaction even if providing blood
were classified as a service. Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57
COLUM. L. REV. 653, 662 (1957); Franklin, supra note 32, at 457.
50. Perlmutter, 308 N.Y. at 101, 123 N.E.2d at 793. The Supreme Court is New York's
lowest court, while the Court of Appeals is its highest.
51. It was not for blood-or iodine or bandages-for which plaintiff bargained, but
the wherewithal of the hospital staff and the availability of hospital facilities to pro-
vide whatever medical treatment was considered advisable .... [I]t is the transac-
tion, regarded in its entirety, which must determine its nature and character. As
long as it involves the medical care and treatment of a patient at a hospital, it is
immaterial that [the hospital supplies] facilities and material.
Id. at 106, 123 N.E.2d at 795.
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furnishing blood as a service and not a sale, strict liability in warranty
was inapplicable. The court reasoned that it would be unfair to hold a
hospital strictly liable, virtually as an insurer, when there was no way to
detect or eliminate hepatitis in blood. It stated that the "art of healing
frequently calls for a balancing of risks and dangers to a patient. Conse-
quently, if injury results from the course adopted, where no negligence or
fault is present, liability should not be imposed upon the institution or
agency actually seeking to save or otherwise assist the patient. '52
Exemptions in California
The sale-service distinction for blood first appeared in California law
in 1955, when the California Legislature enacted the predecessor to
Health & Safety Code Section 1606.53 The statute does not address is-
sues of liability or fault, and the legislative history fails to disclose the
reason for its enactment. At least two California appellate courts, how-
ever, have stated that the statute was inspired by Perlmutter.54 Conse-
quently, California courts have relied on section 1606 and Perlmutter to
preclude strict liability actions in defective blood cases. On this basis,
California appellate courts first extended immunity from strict liability
to hospitals, 55 then to blood banks56 and, finally, to blood product
52. Id. at 107, 123 N.E.2d at 795. The dissenting judge argued that the court had fre-
quently separated the service from the product in past cases, such as those involving an impure
morphine solution. Id. at 111, 123 N.E.2d at 798 (Froessel, J., dissenting). As one commenta-
tor has noted, however, "New York at that time retained some aspects of immunity [from
liability] for charitable hospitals even where their servants were negligent. The court might
have thought it incongruous for the hospital to bear strict liability when it would bear no
liability even for some negligence." Franklin, supra note 32, at 458 n.108. For criticisms of the
Perlmutter decision, see Garibaldi, A New Look at Hospital's Liability for Hepatitis Contami-
nated Blood on Principles of Strict Tort Liability, 48 CHI. BAR REC. 204 (1967); Farnsworth,
supra note 49, at 662; Note, Warranty-Implied Warranties of Quality Held Not Applicable to
Blood Furnished by Hospital to Patient, 103 U. PA. L. Rv. 833 (1955).
53. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1606 (West 1979) was enacted in 1955 as § 1623
and was recodified as § 1606 in 1963. At the time of the statute's enactment in 1955, the
primary dangers to blood were infection and hepatitis. See supra note 1 for the full text of
§ 1606. Similar statutes exist in all but a few states. E.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-1151
(1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 672.316(5) (West Supp. 1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111-1/2,
§ 5102 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-7-2 (West 1984); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 333.9121 (West Supp. 1985); OR. REv. STAT. § 97.300 (1984); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 47-2-316(5) (1979); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 146.31 (West 1985).
54. McDonald v. Sacramento Medical Found. Blood Bank, 62 Cal. App. 3d 866, 133 Cal.
Rptr. 144 (1976); Shepard v. Alexian Bros. Hosp., 33 Cal. App. 3d 606, 109 Cal. Rptr. 132
(1973).
55. Cramer v. Queen of Angels Hosp., 62 Cal. App. 3d 812, 133 Cal. Rptr. 339 (1976);
Shepard v. Alexian Bros. Hosp., 33 Cal. App. 3d 606, 109 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1973).
56. McDonald v. Sacramento Medical Found. Blood Bank, 62 Cal. App. 3d 866, 133 Cal.
Rptr. 444 (1976); Klaus v. Alameda-Contra Costa County Medical Ass'n Blood Bank, 62 Cal.
App. 3d 417, 133 Cal. Rptr. 92 (1976).
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manufacturers. 57
Hospitals
A hospital was first exempted from strict liability on the basis of
section 1606 and Perlmutter in Shepard v. Alexian Brothers Hospital.58
There, the plaintiff sued a hospital on theories of strict liability in tort
and breach of warranty for injuries resulting from a transfusion of blood
contaminated with hepatitis.59 The plaintiff argued that section 1606 was
inapplicable to his tort theory of recovery because a "sale" was not a
prerequisite to strict liability in tort.
While the court acknowledged that the doctrine of strict liability
had been expanded in recent cases in which no direct sale existed, 60 it
emphasized that strict liability had been imposed only when defendants
"played an integral and vital part in the overall production or marketing
enterprise. ",61 It would be inappropriate to impose liability on a hospital,
the court reasoned, as hospitals are not in the business of producing or
marketing blood.62 The court concluded that a blood transfusion, given
in the course of a hospital's care and treatment of a patient, was too
unlike "the normal commercial transaction contemplated in the strict lia-
bility cases [in which] the essence of the transaction relates solely to the
article sold, the seller is in the business of supplying the product to the
consumer and it is that, and that alone for which he is paid."' 63 The
Shepard court also reasoned that the policy rationales underlying strict
liability did not apply to a hospital's furnishing of a blood transfusion. 64
The only strong public policy relevant to the case, the court stated, was
that of "promoting an adequate supply of blood."65
Thus, the Shepard court, citing Perlmutte, found that a blood trans-
57. Fogo v. Cutter Laboratories, 68 Cal. App. 3d 744, 137 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1977).
58. 33 Cal. App. 3d 606, 109 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1973).
59. Id. at 611, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
60. The cases cited in Shepard involved commercial transfers of products or use of prod-
ucts in the course of providing a service. Strict liability extended to defendants such as home
builders. See Shepard, 33 Cal. App. 3d at 612, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 135 for a list of cases.
61. Id. (emphasis in original).
62. Id. at 612, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 136.
63. Id. at 611, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 135 (emphasis in original).
64. For instance, hospitals were not in a position to spread the cost of liability in the price
of the product, since they did not put the product on the market. In addition, the safety
incentive of liability could not be achieved because there was no way to make blood safer. Id.
at 611-12, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 134-35.
65. Id. at 612, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 136 (emphasis in original). In addition, the court stated
that it was
constrained to adhere to the "time-honored, well-established law which states that
those who sell their services for the guidance of others in their economic, financial
and personal affairs are burdened only with a duty of reasonable performance under
the circumstances and cannot be made liable in the absence of negligence or inten-
tional misconduct."
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fusion given in the course of treatment is aptly considered a service be-
cause "[t]he supplying of blood by the hospital is entirely subordinate to
its paramount function [of restoring] the patient's health. ' 66 Because
section 1606 and its underlying rationale, stemming from Perlmutter,
compelled a finding that blood transfusions supplied by a hospital are a
service and not a sale, the court held that the hospital was exempt from
strict liability. 67
In Cramer v. Queen of Angels Hospital, 68 this application of section
1606 survived its first constitutional challenge. In Cramer, the plaintiff,
who allegedly contracted hepatitis from a blood transfusion administered
to him while hospitalized, sued the hospital on theories of strict liability
in tort and breach of warranty. The trial court, relying on Shepard,
granted the hospital's motion for a nonsuit.69
On appeal, the plaintiff contended that section 1606 denied equal
protection to victims of contaminated blood.70 The court found that Cal-
ifornia law follows the federal standard for determining the constitution-
ality of economic regulations such as section 1606.71 For the statute to
survive an equal protection challenge under that standard, there must be
a rational legislative basis "for distinguishing those who suffer injuries
from blood transfusions from those injured by other tortious conduct for
which strict liability is imposed."' 72
The Cramer court reasoned that, because hepatitis was undetectable
in blood, the state had enacted the statute to encourage the production
and use of transfusible blood by protecting providers who were free from
fault. Thus, the court held that section 1606 was constitutional because
it was reasonably related to a legitimate state purpose.73
Blood Banks
In 1976, three years after Shepard had exempted a hospital from
strict liability on the basis of section 1606 and Perlmutter, a California
appellate court extended immunity to a blood bank on the same basis. In
Klaus v. Alameda-Contra Costa County Medical Association Blood
Id. at 613-14, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 136 (quoting Gagne v. Bertran, 43 Cal. 2d 481, 487, 275 P.2d
15, 20 (1954)).
66. Shepard, 33 Cal. App. 3d at 611, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 134.
67. Id. at 610, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 134.
68. 62 Cal. App. 3d 812, 133 Cal. Rptr. 339 (1976).
69. Id. at 814-15, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 339-40.
70. Id. at 815, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 340.
71. Such legislation carries a presumption of constitutionality and is upheld as long as its
distinction bears some rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. Id.
72. McDonald v. Sacramento Medical Found. Blood Bank, 62 Cal. App. 3d 866, 872,
133 Cal. Rptr. 444, 447 (1976).
73. Cramer, 62 Cal. App. 3d at 816, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 341.
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Bank, 74 the plaintiff alleged that he contracted hepatitis from transfusible
blood supplied by the defendant blood bank. The court refused to apply
strict liability, stating that immunity must be extended to blood banks for
the same policy reasons that apply to hospitals.75 Citing Shepard, it held
that the need to promote an adequate blood supply, coupled with the
present inability to detect hepatitis in blood, required blood banks' ex-
emption from strict liability.76 While the court conceded that, unlike
hospitals, blood banks do produce and distribute a product, it looked to
the language of section 1606 and stated that "[r]egardless of the merit of
the public policy considerations, it is clear from the inclusive language of
Section 1606 that the legislative intent was to preclude suits against
blood banks as well as hospitals on the basis of strict liability. '77
That same year, McDonald v. Sacramento Medical Foundation
Blood Bank 78 upheld the constitutionality of applying section 1606 to
exempt blood banks from strict liability. In McDonald, a plaintiff sued a
blood bank for the wrongful death of his wife, who died as a result of
contracting hepatitis from a blood transfusion. The trial court dismissed
the plaintiff's actions of strict liability in tort and warranty.
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that, in enacting section 1606, the
legislature did not intend to preclude strict liability suits. 79 This argu-
ment was supported by the California Legislature's refusal in 1972 to
pass a statute expressly prohibiting the imposition of strict liability to
blood services. 80 The McDonald court rejected this argument, stating
that the legislative intent in failing to pass that statute was unclear. 81
Focusing on the sale-service distinction, the court said that strict liability
might arguably apply in situations in which facts indicating a sale were
"mischaracterized" as a service.82 The court said, however, that section
1606 plainly foreclosed such a mischaracterization of blood. The court
74. 62 Cal. App. 3d 417, 133 Cal. Rptr. 92 (1976).
75. Id. at 418, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 92-93.
76. Id. at 419, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 93. The court suggested in dicta that if "the choice of
donors could be made in a way to mitigate the possibility of infection, a failure to use a reason-
able means of doing so could furnish the basis for a cause of action in negligence." Id.
77. Id.
78. 62 Cal. App. 3d 866, 133 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1976).
79. Id. at 870, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 446. This position has been supported by several com-
mentators. See 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16.04(3)(b) (1975);
Franklin, supra note 32, at 476; Note, supra note 37, at 202 n.31.
80. Cal. Assem. Bill No. 2889 (1971 Reg. Sess.) stated: "No person shall be entitled to
civil damages for injuries sustained as the result of contracting hepatitis by reason of a blood
transfusion either in strict liability or breach of warranty."
81. McDonald, 62 Cal. App. 3d at 870-71, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 446. The court also noted
that recent cases such as Carmichael v. Reitz, 17 Cal. App. 3d 958, 95 Cal. Rptr. 381 (1971)
and Silverhart v. Mount Zion Hosp., 20 Cal. App. 3d 1022, 98 Cal. Rptr. 187 (1971) relied on
Gagne v. Bertran, 43 Cal. 2d 481, 487, 275 P.2d 15, 20 (1954). See supra note 65.
82. McDonald, 62 Cal. App. 3d at 871, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 446-47.
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refused to "second-guess clearly-expressed legislative enactments." 83 It
maintained that section 1606 was a direct result of the Perlmutter deci-
sion and of the California Legislature's intent to codify that decision. 84
The McDonald court then analyzed the constitutionality of section
1606 as applied to blood banks. By weighing the vital need for an avail-
able blood supply for surgery and other medical procedures against the
"relatively minor risk of hepatitis which the blood recipient must take,"
the court found a rational basis for the statute.8 5 Citing the four policy
grounds on which strict liability is usually justified,8 6 the court held that
only one policy, risk-spreading, was relevant to a blood bank but that it
alone was too insignificant to support strict liability.8 7 Thus, the McDon-
ald court held that section 1606 exempted blood banks from strict liabil-
ity and that the statute was constitutional because protection of blood
banks was rationally related to the state's purpose of encouraging the
general blood supply.88
Blood Products Manufacturers
In Fogo v. Cutter Laboratories,8 9 a California court first confronted
the issue of whether section 1606 should be applied to preclude strict
liability against manufacturers of blood products. James Fogo, a mild
hemophiliac, 90 had been given a blood product, a concentrated clotting
agent called Factor IX Konyne, 91 to prevent excessive bleeding while
having his tooth pulled. He contracted hepatitis from the blood product
and died two months later. In a wrongful death suit against the manu-
facturer of the blood-derived clotting agent, Fogo's wife contended that
the product was defective and that the manufacturer should be held
strictly liable. The trial court granted the manufacturer's motion to dis-
miss on the basis of section 1606 and Shepad.92
A California appellate court, "persuaded [by] the clear language of
Section 1606,''93 held that the distribution of blood products was a ser-
vice and not a sale and thereby provided blood products manufacturers
with the same exemption from strict liability as that enjoyed by hospitals
83. Id. at 871, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 447.
84. Id. at 869-70, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 445-46.
85. Id. at 873, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 448.
86. See supra notes 32-46 & accompanying text.
87. McDonald, 62 Cal. App. 3d at 874, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 448.
88. Id. at 873, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 448.
89. 68 Cal. App. 3d 744, 137 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1977).
90. Id. at 748, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 419.
91. "Konyne is a Factor IX concentrate developed by Cutter [Laboratories] through use
of a fractionation process wherein this particular coagulation factor is removed from plasma
extracted from the pooled blood obtained from thousands of donors." Id. at 750, 137 Cal.
Rptr. at 420.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 752, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 422.
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and blood banks.94 The Fogo court recited the Shepard court's rationale
that the risk of hepatitis could not be eliminated despite every effort to
screen donors. Because the blood product was thus unavoidably unsafe,
the court in Fogo likened it to other unavoidably unsafe products such as
penicillin and cortisone.95 The court analogized to those drugs because
the blood product, "despite its hepatitis risk, [had] been instrumental in
helping many hemophiliacs . . .attain normal and productive lives."'96
By protecting blood products manufacturers from strict liability, the
court's decision in Fogo significantly expanded the application of section
1606.
Summary
California courts have attributed to section 1606 a legislative intent
to codify Perlmutter's sale-service distinction to foreclose strict liability
actions against hospitals, blood banks, and blood products manufacturers
in cases involving hepatitis-contaminated blood. Section 1606 has been
held constitutional as applied to hospitals and blood banks because the
strong policy in favor of promoting an adequate blood supply outweighed
the minor risk of hepatitis, which could not be detected or eliminated.
While not expressly holding section 1606 constitutional in the context of
blood products manufacturers, the Fogo court extended immunity from
strict liability to those manufacturers by relying on the inclusive lan-
guage of the statute, by emphasizing that the product's benefits out-
weighed the hepatitis risk, and by analogizing blood products to
innovative drugs with unavoidably unsafe side effects.
From Hepatitis to AIDS
Until AIDS was identified in the early 1980's, viral hepatitis created
the biggest risk of contamination from transfusible blood and blood
products. The increasing incidence of AIDS poses a new and more seri-
ous threat. Thus far, California courts have followed the hepatitis cases
94. Id.
95. Id. at 753, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 422. Those drugs are commonly exempted from strict
liability because, although they cause dangerous side effects in some people, their overall bene-
fit outweighs the risk of their side effects. Id. The court cited W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF TORTS 661 (4th ed. 1971), which states:
The argument that industries producing potentially dangerous products should make
good the harm, distribute it by liability insurance, and add the cost to the price of the
product, encounters reason for pause, when we consider that two of the greatest
medical boons to the human race, penicillin and cortisone, both have their dangerous
side effects, and that drug companies might well have been deterred from producing
and selling them.
96. Fogo, 68 Cal. App. 3d at 754, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 423. In addition, the Fogo court
quoted Shepard's adherence to the "time-honored, well-established law" of Gagne. Id. at 753,
137 Cal. Rptr. at 422; see supra notes 65, 81.
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in rendering their decisions in the AIDS suits. Before analyzing the
AIDS cases, therefore, it is helpful to compare the two diseases.
Hepatitis is a disease that attacks the liver with varying degrees of
severity.97 Although statistics are of limited value because hepatitis often
goes unnoticed and unreported due to its mild symptoms, a five to ten
percent fatality rate has been estimated for cases in which hepatitis is
transmitted by blood transfusion. 98 Until recently, there were no reliable
means for detecting hepatitis in blood,99 but tests have gradually devel-
oped that provide greater reliability. In fact, a 1974 California statute
requiring blood banks to test for hepatitis I°° demonstrates an increased
confidence in testing ability. Tests currently can detect the presence of a
core antibody, which indicates exposure to the hepatitis virus, thereby
revealing carriers who may never have known they had the disease.101
These improved tests are legally significant because courts in prior cases
justified their decisions largely by stressing the impossibility of detecting
hepatitis. Because that condition has changed, so should the courts' ra-
tionale in future cases involving hepatitis contamination.
In early 1981, the first cases of AIDS were reported to the Centers
for Disease Control. 102 AIDS is a virus that attacks the body's immune
system, leaving it vulnerable to disease and infection.10 3 Presently no test
will detect the active AIDS virus in blood, although a recently developed
test indicates exposure to the virus by detecting antibodies in the
blood.1° In 1985, the California Legislature amended Health & Safety
97. See Franklin, supra note 32, at 443 & nn.29-31.
98. See id. at 443 & nn.26-28; Note, Strict Liability for Disease Contracted from Blood
Transfusion, 66 Nw. U. L. REv. 80, 91 & n.50 (1971).
99. Franklin, supra note 32, at 444.
100. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1603.1 (West 1979).
101. On May 1, 1984, the Irwin Memorial Blood Bank in Northern California began test-
ing all blood donations with a second test known as the core antibody to hepatitis. Irwin
Memorial was the first United States blood service to announce plans to adopt the test for
routine use. See IRWIN MEMORIAL BLOOD BANK OF THE SAN FRANCISCO MEDICAL SOCI-
ETY, TOWARD A SAFER BLOOD SUPPLY: A SECOND TEST FOR HEPATITIS (undated).
102. U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL,
MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT (June 5, July 3, 1981) [hereinafter cited as
MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY REPORT].
103. For a definition by the Center for Disease Control ("CDC"), see Miller, O'Connell,
Liepold & Wentzel, Potential Liability for Transfusion-Associated AIDS, 253 J. A.M.A. 3419
(1985). The probable cause of AIDS, a virus known as HTLV-III, was announced in April
1984. P. EBBESON, R. BIGGAR & M. MELBYE, AIDS-A BASIC GUIDE FOR CLINICIANS 199
(1984); Strong New Candidate for AIDS Agent, SCI. MAG., May 4, 1984, at 475.
104. The reliability of the test has been disputed. See Lifson & Engleman, Special Report
on AIDS, STAN. MED., Spring 1985, at 25; Blood Banks Aren't Safe from AIDS, Wall St. J.,
Mar. 20, 1986, at 28, col. 3. But see Blood Bank Tests Make Risk of AIDS "Almost Nonexis-
tent' San Francisco Chron., Aug. 1, 1985, at 6, col. 1 (federal health officials state test is
99.8% effective); see also New Test Detects AIDS Virus Itself, San Francisco Chron., April 12,
1986, at 1, col. 2 (Scientists say they have discovered a test to detect the active AIDS virus
itself and predict that within a year or two it could replace the present antibody test.).
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Code section 1603.1 to require that all blood and blood components to be
used in vitro in humans be tested for the AIDS antibody. 10 5
Hepatitis B virus and AIDS share several recognized similarities: 10 6
both can be transmitted parenterally (by injection) and sexually; 0 7
hemophiliacs are in the known high-risk groups associated with both dis-
eases;' 0 8 the incubation period for both is considerable, though the incu-
bation period for AIDS is now believed by some to be far longer than for
hepatitis; 10 9 and both diseases were originally undetectable in blood,
although modern breakthroughs have significantly reduced that
problem. "10
The risk of exposure to both AIDS and hepatitis varies depending
on whether the blood comes from a hospital, a blood bank, or a blood
products manufacturer. The risk of contamination from either disease
increases dramatically when blood is collected from paid rather than vol-
unteer donors. "'1 Hospitals and blood banks primarily use volunteer do-
nors, while blood products manufacturers collect blood primarily from
paid donors. 1 2
The risk of blood contamination also increases dramatically when
donors' blood is pooled, a method used by blood products manufacturers
to produce the concentrated clotting factor for hemophiliacs." 13 Pooling
mixes blood from thousands of individuals in a manufacturing procedure
such that if even one donor's blood is contaminated, the entire batch will
105. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1603.1 (West Supp. 1986).
106. Miller, O'Connell, Liepold & Wentzel, supra note 103, at 3420.
107. Id.
108. Id.; see also P. EBBESON, R. BIGGAR & M. MELBYE, supra note 103, at 146; Check,
Preventing AIDS Transmission: Should Blood Donors Be Screened 249 J. A.M.A. 567, 568
(1983) ("AIDS was the second leading cause of death among hemophiliacs in 1982 .. ");
Strong New Candidate for AIDS Agent, SCI. MAG., May 4, 1984, at 475 (Hemophiliacs are at
high risk because they use a derivative factor from the blood of thousands of donors; "people
who receive whole blood are at a much lower risk.").
109. See infra note 119.
110. See supra notes 101, 104 & accompanying text.
111. R. ECKERT & E. WALLACE, SECURING A SAFER BLOOD SUPPLY: Two VIEwS 123,
138 (1985); see Franklin, supra note 32, at 444-45 (reasons for increased risk). Contra R.
ECKERT & E. WALLACE, supra, at 26 (arguing that "cash blood is not of lower quality if
registries are employed and suppliers are screened with sufficient care").
112. California Health & Safety Code § 1626 strictly regulates the use of paid donors for
blood transfusions. It renders unlawful the transfusion of blood from a paid donor unless "the
physician performing the transfusion has determined, taking into consideration the condition
of the patient who is the recipient of the transfusion, that other blood of a type compatible with
the blood type of the patient cannot reasonably be obtained for the transfusion." CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1626 (West 1979). This statute does not apply to blood products.
113. See, e.g., P. EBBESON, R. BIGGAR & M. MELBYE, supra note 103, at 203 (stating that
"it appears that the risk to persons with hemophilia may be 3 orders of magnitude greater than
that for recipients of single donor products"); Note, Liability for Blood Transfusion Injuries, 42
MINN. L. REV. 640, 644-45 (1958). But see Gascon, Zoumbos & Young, Immunologic Abnor-
malities in Patients Receiving Multiple Blood Transfusions, 100 ANNALS INTERNAL MED.,
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be contaminated. Because each batch of the concentrated blood product
goes to many patients, the risk of exposure increases exponentially.
1 14
The most significant difference between hepatitis and AIDS is the
fatality rate. Unlike the relatively low rate in hepatitis cases,' 15 AIDS is
fatal in virtually every case. 116 In addition, the incidence of AIDS is
doubling every six months,117 while the incidence of hepatitis does not
vary significantly from year to year. 8 The development and improve-
ment of screening tests undoubtedly will decrease the incidence of AIDS
transmitted through transfusible blood and blood products. Because of
the long incubation period of the AIDS virus, however, an increasing
number of cases will arise from those who have already contracted AIDS
but have not yet manifested its symptoms.119
The Cases Involving AIDS-Contaminated Blood
Since 1984, several victims of AIDS have initiated lawsuits in Cali-
fornia alleging that they contracted the disease through contaminated
transfusible blood or blood products. These claims are against hospitals,
blood banks, and blood products manufacturers.
The plaintiffs in Burg v. Cedars-Sinai Hospital 120 and Kushnick v.
Cedars-Sinai Hospital 121 received blood transfusions during hospitaliza-
tion and contracted AIDS. Both plaintiffs filed suit against the hospital
on a strict products liability theory. In both cases, the trial court dis-
missed the actions. The plaintiffs in Johnstone v. San Francisco Medical
Feb. 1984, at 176 ("The relative risk of [fractionated] concentrate versus large numbers of
single unit blood transfusions may be difficult to estimate.").
The pooling method is a necessary element of fractionation, the process used to produce
AHF concentrate, one treatment of hemophilia. The other treatment is cryoprecipitate, made
from individual units of fresh frozen plasma. See MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY REPORT,
supra note 102, at 16 (July 16, 1982).
114. See Check, supra note 108, at 568.
115. See supra note 98 & accompanying text.
116. As of December 1983, the CDC knew of 2952 AIDS cases. Acquired Immu-
nodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) Associated with Transfusions, 310 NEw ENG. J. MED., Jan. 12,
1984, at 75. As of January 8, 1985, there were 7788 cases of AIDS with 3687 deaths. Miller,
O'Connell, Liepold & Wentzel, supra note 103, at 3419. As of July 26, 1985, 12,067 cases were
reported with 6097 deaths. San Francisco Chron., Aug. 1, 1985, at 6, col. 1.
117. Special Report on AIDS, supra note 104, at 25.
118. R. ECKERT & E. WALLACE, supra note 111, at 3 ("Each year 7 to 12 percent of
transfusion patients ... contract hepatitis.").
119. "The incubation period for AIDS is thought to be from two to eight months but may
be as long as four years." Miller, O'Connell, Liepold & Wentzel, supra note 103, at 3419; see
also Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) Associated with Transfusions, supra note
116, at 70 (of the transfusion-associated AIDS cases in the cited study, the "time between
transfusion and onset of illness ranged from 10 to 43 months").
120. No. WEC 84010 (Santa Monica Super. Ct. filed Nov. 3, 1983).
121. No. WEC 82861 (Santa Monica Super. Ct. filed Jan. 7, 1984).
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Society 122 sued a blood bank for the wrongful death of the decedent, who
died in 1984 from an AIDS-contaminated blood transfusion supplied by
the defendant. Again, the trial court summarily dismissed the plaintiffs'
strict liability action.
Gallagher v. Cutter Laboratories123 involved a wrongful death suit
against commercial blood products manufacturers based on theories of
negligence and strict liability in tort. The Gallagher case is notable for
the trial court's refusal to dismiss the strict liability suit, even in the face
of section 1606. The decedent, a hemophiliac, regularly self-adminis-
tered injections of a concentrated blood product manufactured by the
defendants. He contracted AIDS and died, allegedly from a batch of the
coagulant he had received. The lawsuit challenged the constitutionality
of section 1606 as it applies to blood product manufacturers. Plaintiff
also contended that section 1606 was not intended to preclude strict lia-
bility and that the public policy rationales underlying strict liability sup-
ported its imposition upon blood products manufacturers.1 24
The Gallagher trial court twice denied defendants' motions to dis-
miss the strict liability actions on the grounds of section 1606 and
Fogo. 125 These much-publicized rulings, apparently the first of their kind
in the nation since the advent of AIDS, 126 provided the plaintiffs a short-
lived victory. The defendants successfully sought a writ of mandamus
from the court of appeal to compel the trial court to set aside its order
overruling their demurrers. 127
Plaintiffs contended on appeal that section 1606 should not apply to
blood products manufacturers for three reasons: first, the statute was not
intended to provide immunity from civil liability; second, commercial
manufacturers, as distinct from hospitals and blood banks, are not prov-
iders of services but merely producers of products subject to the "stream-
of-commerce rationale of strict product liability"; and third, valid policy
reasons exist for subjecting blood products manufacturers to strict liabil-
ity. 128 While the court recognized that "[e]ach of these contentions is
plausible," it refused to tamper with section 1606's "clear and unambig-
122. No. 826447 (San Francisco Super. Ct. filed July 9, 1984).
123. No. 548947 (Santa Clara Super. Ct. filed May 11, 1984).
124. Plaintiffs Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Demurrer, Gal-
lagher v. Cutter Laboratories, Inc., No. 548947 (Santa Clara Super. Ct. July 9, 1985).
125. Defendant Cutter Laboratories' demurrer was overruled on April 9, 1985, by Judge
Flaherty. On August 23, 1985, defendant Hyland Therapeutics' demurrer was overruled by
Judge Gordon. See Hyland Therapeutics v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. App. 3d 509, 516, 220
Cal. Rptr. 590, 594 (1985).
126. See Update, CAL. LAW., July 1985, at 10, col. 2; Women's Death Will Not Stop a
Lawsuit Against Blood Bank, San Francisco Recorder, June 24, 1985, at 10, col. 1; Blood Prod-
ucts Maker Can Be Liable in AIDS Cases, Nat'l L.J., Apr. 29, 1985, at 6, col. 1.
127. Hyland Therapeutics v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. App. 3d 509, 220 Cal. Rptr. 590
(1985).
128. Id. at 514, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 592.
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uous" language, suggesting that the plaintiff address her arguments to
the legislature.129
Finally, the appellate court held that section 1606 was constitutional
as applied to blood products manufacturers. The court reasoned that the
statute's "relatively modest restriction" on the plaintiff's available theo-
ries of recovery was rationally related to the state's legitimate interest in
encouraging the manufacture of blood products. 130
The plaintiff appealed the ruling, but on March 12, 1986, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court refused to hear the case.131 It may be some time
before California's highest court directly addresses the issue of liability
for AIDS-contaminated blood. Until then, it seems likely that lower
courts will continue to dismiss strict liability actions on the basis of sec-
tion 1606.
The Need for a New Approach
These AIDS cases--Gallagher in particular-compel a reexamina-
tion of section 1606's applicability to strict products liability suits. AIDS
is far more severe than hepatitis,13 2 and the severity of the potential dan-
ger is a key factor in determining strict liability.13 3 Moreover, technolog-
ical advances render the risk-benefit analyses in earlier cases outdated.
A reexamination of the scope and meaning of section 1606 in blood
products cases indicates several reasons for extending strict liability to
commercial blood products manufacturers, but not to hospitals or blood
banks. First, the courts' reliance on section 1606 to preclude strict liabil-
ity in all blood-related cases may be misplaced. Second, even assuming
that the statute is relevant in determining strict liability in tort, the stat-
ute's characterization of the manufacture and distribution of blood prod-
ucts as a "service" is unfounded. Finally, the policies underlying strict
products liability justify the application of that doctrine to blood prod-
ucts manufacturers but not to hospitals or blood banks.
Questionable Legislative Intent
California courts have precluded strict liability actions involving
129. Id. at 514, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 593.
130. Id. at 516, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 594.
131. Hyland Therapeutics v. Superior Court, 6 Dist. H001204, petition for review of real
parties in interest denied Mar. 12, 1986, Minutes of the Cal. Sup. Ct., pamphlet no. 9 at 28.
132. See supra notes 97-119 & accompanying text.
133. Barker v. Lull Eng'g, 20 Cal. 3d 413, 431, 573 P.2d 443, 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 237
(1978). In light of the AIDS crisis, the medical community has recognized that, "[d]espite
common law precedents governing contaminated blood, there is no predetermined common
law rule or formula that can be applied per se to AIDS lawsuits with a reasonably clear re-
sult." Miller, O'Connell, Liepold & Wentzel, supra note 103, at 3419. "[T]he legal issues
associated with AIDS are on relatively untrod ground." Id. at 3420.
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transfusible blood and blood products largely on the assumption that the
state legislature enacted section 1606 to codify Perlmutter, 134 which de-
nied recovery on a strict liability theory. 135 While section 1606's legisla-
tive history does not specify the statute's purpose, several factors refute
the notion that the legislature intended to codify Perlmutter by enacting
section 1606.
First, substantial evidence indicates that the legislature enacted the
statute to provide an exemption to the sales and use tax, not to provide
immunity from civil liability. The Office of Legislative Counsel stated:
The only effect that this bill would possibly have, so far as we are
aware, is with respect to the sales and use tax. To the extent that it is
consistent with that law, it will have the effect of indicating that the
enumerated transactions with respect to human blood are not within
the scope of the sales and use tax. 136
In addition, the Attorney General's Office stated in an Inter-Departmen-
tal Memo that "[i]t seems that the purpose of this section is to provide an
exemption from the State Sales and Use Tax Law."' 137
Second, because Perlmutter was decided by the New York Court of
Appeals just twenty days before section 1623, the predecessor of section
1606, was introduced in the California Senate,1 38 it is doubtful whether
the statute's drafters knew of the Perlmutter decision while framing the
statute. Even if Perlmutter did inspire such swift legislative action, it
seems likely that the decision or its principles would at least have been
mentioned in the legislative history. To the contrary, however, the legis-
lative history contains no reference either to Perlmutter or to civil
liability. 139
The theory that the legislature intended to codify Perlmutter was
first questioned five years after the statute's enactment in Gottsdanker v.
Cutter Laboratories, 140 a 1960 case involving a faulty polio vaccine that
transmitted live polio virus to two children. Although Gottsdanker did
not specifically involve a blood transfusion, the defendant attempted to
avoid strict liability by reference to section 1623. In dicta, the court left
134. 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954); see supra notes 48-52 & accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 67, 74-77, 89-94 & accompanying text.
136. REPORT ON S.B. 1405, OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL (June 7, 1955) (copy on
file with The Hastings Law Journal).
137. Inter-Departmental Communication from Office of the Attorney General to Gover-
nor Goodwin J. Knight (June 8, 1955) (copy on file with The Hastings Law Journal).
138. The Perlmutter decision was rendered on December 31, 1954, while § 1623, the iden-
tical predecessor to § 1606, was introduced on January 20, 1955, as Senate Bill 1405. Cal. Sen.
Bill No. 1405 (1955 Reg. Sess.).
139. Despite the absence of a clear legislative intent, it can be argued that § 1606 affects
civil liability suits because similar statutes in other states do expressly foreclose strict liability
actions. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, § 5102 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 70.54.120 (Supp. 1986).
140. 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1960).
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open the questions of whether the statute was inspired by Perlmutter and
whether it was designed to bar application of implied warranties to blood
products; 41 however, the court was clearly unwilling to connect section
1623 unequivocally to Perlmutter as courts have done so readily in cases
arising more than twenty years after the statute was passed. 142
The Sale-Service Distinction
If section 1606 was indeed enacted in response to Perlmutter, the
statute still should not be controlling in cases involving theories of re-
covery based on strict liability in tort. In 1954, when Perlmutter was
decided, strict liability was based solely on an implied warranty theory.
Implied warranties derived from the existence of some contractual rela-
tionship between a seller and a buyer; the presence of a direct "sale"
therefore was a key element to establishing strict liability in warranty.
The Perlmutter decision rested primarily on the finding that no "sale"
was involved.143 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 144 however, supple-
mented strict liability in warranty with the alternative doctrine of strict
liability in tort. 145 This alternative remedy eliminated the necessity of a
direct contractual relationship such as a sale. 146 Strict liability in tort
requires only a marketed product containing a defect and harm to a user
caused by that defect.' 47 Thus, the rigid sale-service distinction codified
in section 1606 simply is not germane to actions instituted since
Greenman. 148
Even if the sale-service distinction were relevant to a tort theory of
141. Id. at 609-10, 6 Cal. Rptr. at 324-25. Admittedly, the questions did not require an
answer, since the court held that the polio vaccine was not within the scope of the statute.
142. See supra notes 74-94 & accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 51-52 & accompanying text.
144. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 277 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
145. Shepard v. Alexian Bros. Hosp., 33 Cal. App. 3d 606, 614, 109 Cal. Rptr. 132, 137
(1973); Grinnell v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 274 Cal. App. 2d 424, 432, 79 Cal. Rptr. 369, 373
(1969).
146. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 8, at 692.
147. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62, 377 P.2d 897, 900, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697, 700 (1963).
148. See generally Boland, Strict Liability in Tort for Transfusing Contaminated Blood, 23
ARK. L. REv. 236, 236 (1969) (posing appropriate questions to be considered in warranty
actions and in tort actions). Although the tort theory of strict liability in California does not
require an actual "sale," it does require some commercial transfer of goods. It is not to be
applied when only services were rendered. See Pena v. Sita World Travel, Inc., 88 Cal. App.
3d 642, 644, 152 Cal. Rptr. 17, 18 (1978) (services of travel agent); Barton v. Owen, 71 Cal.
App. 3d 484, 498, 139 Cal. Rptr. 494, 502 (1977) (medical services).
The doctrine of strict liability has been applied in cases in which a product is supplied as
part of a commercial transaction such as a restaurant's service of tainted food; however, the
doctrine has been rejected in the hybrid sale-service transaction in which a product is used in
the course of rendering a professional service. See Note, Products and the Professional. Strict
Liability in the Sale-Service Hybrid Transaction, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 111 (1972).
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recovery, the statute's classification of the manufacturer's blood product
as a "service" distorts commercial reality. Like the objectives of other
manufacturers, a commercial blood product manufacturer's sole purpose
is to sell its product at a profit.' 49 Both Fogo' 50 and Gallagherl5' in-
volved a concentrated blood clotting agent sold to hemophiliacs. When
the manufacturer sold its product, it engaged in precisely that type of
commercial transaction that Shepard v. Alexian Brothers Hospital 52
cited as the "normal" transaction contemplated in strict liability cases. 153
The manufacturer does not sell services for the "guidance of others in
their economic, financial or personal affairs."' 54 It sells no service at all,
and thus the transaction is not even a sale-service hybrid. 55
In contrast, hospitals are primarily service-oriented. Hospital staff
administer blood transfusions in the course of treating patients. Trans-
fusible blood is unique and essential to the hospital's comprehensive
medical treatment. Thus, the professional services of hospitals, which
include supplying blood transfusions, are not the normal commercial
transactions to which strict liability applies.
Blood banks process and distribute transfusible blood but do not
place it into the general stream of commerce. They supply it directly to
hospitals for use in the professional service of treating patients. Blood
banks are integrally related to service-oriented hospitals because patient
treatment often depends on their supply of transfusible blood. In view of
this unique relationship, blood banks should also be immune from strict
liability.
The Fogo court extended section 1606 to preclude strict liability
against a blood products manufacturer. While recognizing significant
differences between such manufacturers and the service-oriented hospital
in Shepard and the blood bank in Klaus v. Alameda-Contra Costa County
Medical Association Blood Bank, 156 the court felt compelled by the lan-
guage of section 1606 to exempt the manufacturer from strict liability.
Thus, the court let pass an opportunity to analyze the differences be-
149. In fact, the product is packaged and sold by prescription. Note that the plaintiff in
Fogo, a mild hemophiliac, received the injection from his doctor prior to a tooth extraction.
Fogo, 68 Cal. App. 3d at 750, 137 Cal. Rptr. 419-20.
150. Fogo v. Cutter Laboratories, Inc., 68 Cal. App. 3d 744, 137 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1977); see
supra notes 89-96 & accompanying text.
151. Gallagher v. Cutter Laboratories, Inc., No. 548947 (Santa Clara Super. Ct. filed May
11, 1984); see supra notes 123-31 & accompanying text.
152. 33 Cal. App. 3d 606, 109 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1973).
153. Id. at 611, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 135; see supra note 63 & accompanying text. The prod-
uct is sold by prescription for use at home. The hemophiliac mixes the concentrate and self-
administers the product by injection; the process is comparable to self-administration of insulin
by a diabetic.
154. Shepard, 33 Cal. App. 3d at 614, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 136.
155. See supra note 148.
156. 62 Cal. App. 3d 417, 133 Cal. Rptr. 92 (1976).
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tween blood products manufacturers and other entities with specific ref-
erence to the strict liability rationales.
This failure to distinguish between blood products manufacturers
and suppliers of transfusible blood allowed the court to propose an alter-
native, but questionable, basis for its holding. In addition to the exemp-
tion it found in section 1606, the Fogo court stressed that the hepatitis
risk could not be eliminated completely and that blood products had nev-
ertheless proven quite helpful to hemophiliacs. 157 The court suggested
that this small but constant risk, when weighed against the benefits pro-
vided, rendered blood products "unavoidably unsafe" as a matter of law
and therefore exempt from strict liability in the same manner as prescrip-
tion drugs such as penicillin and cortisone.1 58
This analysis, perhaps appropriate for transfusible blood,1 59 should
not be applied to blood products. While some risk may be inevitable, the
level of risk posed by blood products could be reduced substantially by
eliminating the pooling process and the use of blood taken from paid or
high-risk donors.1 60 These additional risks simply do not justify the
legal characterization of blood products as "unavoidably unsafe." A
more logical approach would weigh these risks against the benefits pro-
vided to determine whether the product is defective as a question of fact.
In other words, the situation in Fogo logically presents an action of strict
liability in tort. Had the court proceeded under strict liability, a jury
could have conducted a valid risk-benefit analysis using the relevant fac-
tors listed in Barker. 1 6 , The jury still might have rendered a verdict for
the defendant on the strict liability cause of action by concluding that the
blood product was not "defective" because its benefits outweighed the
"relatively minor risk of hepatitis."1 62 Strict liability, however, would
have been tried properly, and the burden of proof would properly have
been placed on the defendant to establish the nonexistence of a
"defect." 163
Given the failure of past attempts to bring strict liability actions
157. Fogo, 68 Cal. App. 3d at 752-54, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 422-23; see supra note 96 & accom-
panying text.
158. Fogo, 68 Cal. App. 3d at 753, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 422.
159. Id. (citing W. PROSSER, supra note 95, at 661-62).
160. See supra notes 111-14 & accompanying text; see also Finn v. G.D. Searle & Co., 35
Cal. 3d 691, 721-22, 677 P.2d 1147, 1167, 200 Cal. Rptr. 870, 889-91 (1984) (Bird, C.J.,
dissenting) (arguing that prescription drugs in a strict liability action should be evaluated by a
jury under the Barker risk-benefit test, rather than simply dismissed by the court as "unavoid-
ably unsafe").
161. See supra note 28 & accompanying text.
162. The McDonald court coined the phrase "relatively minor risk of hepatitis." McDon-
ald v. Sacramento Medical Found. Blood Bank, 62 Cal. App. 3d 866, 873, 133 Cal. Rptr. 444,
448 (1976); see supra note 85 & accompanying text.
163. See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 431, 573 P.2d 443, 455, 143 Cal. Rptr.
225, 237 (1978).
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against providers of transfusible blood, and the courts' construction of
section 1606 in those cases, it is perhaps understandable that the Fogo
court declined to apply strict liability to the defendant blood products
manufacturer. Still, section 1606 remains susceptible to interpretation,
since it does not specifically mention liability, and its legislative back-
ground suggests rather strongly that it was enacted solely for tax pur-
poses.' 64 This Note argues that a proper interpretation of the statute,
guided by the underlying rationales of strict liability, would not extend
immunity to blood products manufacturers.
The Policy Considerations of Strict Liability in Contaminated
Blood Cases
There are four policies underlying the imposition of strict liability:
relieving plaintiffs from the problems of proving negligence in product
defect cases; serving as an incentive to improve product safety; providing
an equitable way to spread economic risk; and inducing allocation of
consumer resources toward safer products.165 As this section demon-
strates, each of these policies supports the imposition of strict liability
upon commercial manufacturers of blood products.
The Problems of Negligence
To recover under a negligence cause of action, a plaintiff must prove
that the manufacturer breached the standard of care in the production or
design of the product and that such breach was a proximate cause of the
resulting injury. 166 Strict liability serves as a means for plaintiffs to cir-
cumvent problems of proof of negligence inherent in products liability
cases. 167
In cases involving contaminated blood products, the hemophiliac 68
who uses the product and contracts hepatitis or AIDS may find that
proving negligence is extremely difficult. Because of the time elapsed be-
tween contamination and manifestations of the disease, months or, in the
case of AIDS, years may have passed since its transmission. Such a delay
could make it impossible to pinpoint the date of contamination and the
manufacturer's standard of care at the time. Most hemophiliacs use
blood-derivative concentrates that are manufactured from pooled
164. See supra notes 136-37 & accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 32-46 & accompanying text.
166. See supra note 29 & accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 32-36 & accompanying text.
168. Although it is conceivable that some other customer may use a blood-derivative
product at some time, this Note refers to hemophiliacs because they are the most common
users of blood-derivative products and have been the plaintiffs in contaminated blood-product
cases.
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blood 69 and receive many different "lots" of that concentrate during
their lifetime.170 Moreover, with recent improvements in screening tests
and manufacturing techniques, the standard of care for the production of
clotting factor has changed rapidly and drastically in recent years.
Therefore, the hemophiliac victim who cannot identify the contaminated
lot will lack proof of the manufacturer's breach of the standard of care,
which is an important requirement in a negligence action.
This difficulty in proving negligence is not as prevalent in cases in-
volving contamination from blood transfusions supplied by a hospital or
blood bank. In contrast to the hemophiliac's continuing, long-term use
of blood-derivative products, patients who receive blood transfusions are
usually in a hospital for an easily defined period of time. Thus, it is easier
for the victim of a contaminated blood transfusion to pinpoint the source
of the blood and to identify the standard of care.
Safety Incentive
Public policy demands that liability be placed on the entity that can
most effectively improve a product's safety. 171 Because blood products
manufacturers control the methods for the design and production of
their product, they are in a better position than the consumer to improve
169. A typical hemophilia patient in the United States is treated with approximately
50,000 units of antihemophilic factor (AHF) annually. Most patients are on home
treatment programs using freeze-dried AHF concentrates prepared from pooled
plasma. A production lot of AHF concentrate may contain plasma from 5000 to
50,000 individual donors. .. . [Miost hemophiliacs receive AHF concentrate from
several different lots each year.
P. EBBESON, R. BIGGAR & M. MELBYE, supra note 103, at 200-01.
170. Id. For example, while the present standard of care for the production of blood-
derivative products includes using the AIDS antibody test, the standard of care in 1983 would
not have included that test because it did not yet exist. A hemophiliac could have received a
contaminated dose of AHF concentrate in 1983, yet not discover he had contracted AIDS
until 1985 when he manifested symptoms. This principle also holds true for hepatitis cases,
but the example is even more dramatic in the AIDS context because of its longer incubation
period. See supra note 119. By then, the hemophiliac likely would have received numerous
other doses from other "lots" of concentrate and would not necessarily know at what time,
and from what lot, he contracted the AIDS virus. As the American Medical Association
Journal has noted, "Unfortunately, since each hemophilia patient receives many lots of con-
centrate over the course of a few years, it is not possible to identify the infectious lots." Check,
supra note 108, at 568. Without knowing which lot of concentrate was contaminated and
when it was produced, the hemophiliac would find it nearly impossible to ascertain the stan-
dard of care used; without establishing the standard of care, it would be difficult to find a
breach. Because of this difficulty in proving negligence, the courts' preclusion of strict liability
against a blood products manufacturer is not a "relatively modest restriction" on the plaintiff,
as the court stated in Hyland Therapeutics v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. App. 3d 509, 516, 220
Cal. Rptr. 590, 594 (1985), but rather a substantial restriction. Thus, the doctrine of strict
liability in these cases will provide an injured plaintiff with an available avenue for relief when
negligence may be present, but difficult to prove.
171. See supra notes 37-39 & accompanying text.
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safety. For example, manufacturers can locate their blood collection cen-
ters away from neighborhoods with large populations of high-risk donors
or simply refuse blood from such donors. They can promote research to
develop and improve screening tests for the detection and elimination of
hepatitis and AIDS in blood. 172 More notably, manufacturers can use
noncommercial sources for blood collection whenever possible. In con-
trast to hospitals and blood banks, blood products manufacturers use
paid blood donors, a method which contributes to the danger of the
blood product.1 7 3 In addition, manufacturers pool the blood from
thousands of donors to produce freeze-dried concentrated clotting fac-
tor.174 Pooling dramatically increases the risk of contamination. 75 This
safety incentive policy is less relevant to hospitals and blood banks, since
they use neither paid donors nor the pooling process in collecting trans-
fusible blood.
Resource Allocation
Under the resource allocation rationale, a product's price should re-
flect its true cost to society. I76 If two products can substitute for one
another to some significant extent, and the price of the more dangerous
product reflects its attendant risk factor, consumers will have a more ac-
curate comparison when choosing which product to buy. 177
Resource allocation principles apply to blood products manufactur-
ers because cryoprecipitate and freeze-dried concentrated clotting factor
are significant substitutes for one another in treating hemophilia.' 7 8 Cry-
oprecipitate is a fresh-frozen plasma product, made from individual units
of single-donor plasma, while freeze-dried concentrated clotting factor is
produced by fractionation, which involves extracting plasma protein
from thousands of pooled blood donors. 17 9 Cryoprecipitate is a safer
product because the risk of contamination from one donor is drastically
less than that risk multiplied by thousands of donors pooled together.
The freeze-dried concentrated clotting factor, while riskier, is a more
convenient product for hemophiliacs because it can be stored at home
without special freezers. It is also more effective in treating
hemophiliacs, especially those with severe hemophilia. Despite their dif-
ferences, the two products reasonably can be considered substitutes for
172. While these considerations might also apply to hospitals and blood banks, it is the
aggregate of these and other considerations applying to manufacturers that make them
relevant.
173. See supra note 111 & accompanying text.
174. See supra note 113 & accompanying text.
175. See supra note 114 & accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 42-45 & accompanying text.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 43-45.
178. See MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY REPORT, supra note 102, at 16 (July 16, 1982).
179. Id.
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one another in many cases. 180
Thus, the resource allocation theory applies to these blood products
manufacturers. This theory is not applicable to hospitals and blood
banks, on the other hand, because "there is no substitute for [transfusi-
ble] blood."181
Risk-Spreading
Another policy underlying strict products liability, risk-spreading, is
premised on the belief that the cost of an accident should be placed on
the entity that caused the accident rather than on the accident victim. 8 2
The public is less likely to anticipate the likelihood or the seriousness of
the risk. Even if a consumer recognizes the risk, it is improbable that he
can do much to guard against it. This is particularly true among the
high-risk groups associated with both hepatitis and AIDS contamination,
such as hemophiliacs. Because of their classification as high-risk candi-
dates, hemophiliacs may find it difficult to obtain insurance. If insurance
is available, the premiums likely will be astronomical. In addition, insur-
ance, unlike a judgment in a tort liability suit, will not reimburse the
victim for pain and suffering. This deficiency is especially noteworthy in
AIDS cases because sufferers undergo months of pain and suffering in
anticipation of inevitable death.
In keeping with the public policy of risk-spreading, it is fairer to
place the cost of injury with the product manufacturer, who can absorb
and spread the cost by increasing the price of the product. As is the case
with other types of manufacturers, the blood products manufacturer can
adjust the product's price to include the cost of liability insurance and of
more expensive production methods employed in an attempt to minimize
risk.
Manufacturers will argue that exposure to strict liability will lead to
exorbitant insurance premiums or difficulty in obtaining adequate insur-
ance. While this argument has some truth, the manufacturer is still in a
better position than one individual to insure against risks. Manufactur-
ers can lessen their financial burden by spreading it among all consumers
of a product, while individuals have no way to minimize the financial
impact. Moreover, the force of this argument has weakened with time.
180. In fact, all hemophiliacs used cryoprecipitate before the freeze-dried concentrates
were developed. Indeed, because of the increased risk of contamination in the AHF concen-
trate, some physicians have switched their patients with mild to moderate hemophilia back to
treatment using cryoprecipitate whenever possible. P. EBBESON, R. BIGGAR & M. MELBYE,
supra note 103, at 205. As of mid-1982, there were an estimated 20,000 patients with hemo-
philia A in the United States. Of those, 60% were classified as severe, and 40% were classified
as moderate. MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY REPORT, supra note 102, at 16 (July 16, 1982).
181. McDonald v. Sacramento Medical Found. Blood Bank, 62 Cal. App. 3d 866, 874,
133 Cal. Rptr. 444, 448 (1976).
182. See supra notes 40-41 & accompanying text.
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The incidence of AIDS contamination is not static; it has steadily de-
creased with the development of better screening tests and treatment pro-
cedures. This situation continues to improve. In April 1986, scientists
reported the discovery of a test to detect the active AIDS virus, which
they predict will replace the current antibody test within a year or
two. 183 As tests improve, risks decrease, and insurance coverage be-
comes more economical.
Manufacturers may also argue that the hemophiliac consumer base
is too small to spread the increased cost effectively. Manufacturers may
be forced to raise prices significantly. If prices cannot be raised enough
to cover additional costs, there is a danger that manufacturers will stop
making the product. The likelihood of this extreme consequence, how-
ever, is questionable. The problem of price increases in the context of
AIDS-contaminated blood arose when newly developed screening tests
were suggested as mandatory.1 84 Although manufacturers expressed
concern that costs would become exorbitant, blood products continued
to be produced after the tests indeed became mandatory.
While the concern over insurance costs and price increases cannot
be dismissed, such concerns must be evaluated with reference to the ca-
pacity of developing technology to reduce the risk of contamination. Be-
tween the discovery of AIDS and the development and use of screening
tests, consumers of blood products ran a higher risk of contracting the
disease than they do today. Because AIDS can incubate for up to four
years or more, new lawsuits will arise as individuals discover they have
the disease.185 Currently, though, officials at both the Centers for Dis-
ease Control and the United States Public Health Service consider the
AIDS antibody test 99.8% effective, although the precise number of false
results is debatable. 8 6 Recent improvements in testing promise in-
creased efficiency. Thus, while lawsuits originating in the initial years
when testing was unavailable may continue to be brought, the incidence
of AIDS contamination from blood products will be increasingly rare.
In this environment, the manufacture of blood products will undoubtedly
remain economically viable.
Moreover, hemophiliacs probably will be willing to pay more for
their blood products if they know that they have a viable remedy against
a manufacturer in the event of contamination. In addition, California
administers several state programs, such as Medi-Cal and the Geneti-
cally Handicapped Persons Program, which subsidize treatment for
183. New Test Detects AIDS Itself San Francisco Chron., April 12, 1986, at 1, col. 2.
184. See Check, supra note 108, at 570; Goldsmith, HTLV-III Testing of Donor Blood
Imminent; Complex Issues Remain, 253 J. A.M.A. 173, 179-80 (1985).
185. Blood Bank Tests Make Risk of AIDS 'Almost Nonexistent, San Francisco Chron.,
Aug. 1, 1985, at 6, col. 1.
186. Id.; see supra note 104.
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hemophiliacs and can help bear the burden of cost increases. 187
The policy of risk-spreading applies even to blood banks, as the
court in McDonald v. Sacramento Medical Foundation Blood Bank 1 88
recognized, and presumably might apply to hospitals as well. However,
none of the other strict liability rationales apply to either blood banks or
hospitals, and risk-spreading alone is insufficient to justify imposition of
strict liability upon those entities.18 9 Because all four strict liability ratio-
nales are applicable in suits against blood products manufacturers, public
policy favors the imposition of strict liability upon such manufacturers.
Proposal
Because the manufacture and distribution of blood products are nor-
mal commercial transactions despite their mischaracterization as "serv-
ices" in section 1606, and because strict liability's underlying rationales
support its application in cases involving blood products, strict liability
should be imposed upon blood products manufacturers. Although Cali-
fornia courts have had the opportunity to restrict the immunity provided
by section 1606, they have declined to take this approach. Therefore, the
legislature should amend the statute to clarify and limit its application to
avoid further judicial misinterpretation and to ensure uniform applica-
tion of the statute in civil liability suits.
The amendment should eliminate judicial guesswork in issues of
civil liability in blood-contamination cases by restricting liability of sup-
pliers of transfusible blood to acts constituting negligence or unlawful
conduct. This amendment should also allow the courts to impose strict
liability against blood products manufacturers who engage in the com-
mercial transactions to which strict liability rationales apply.
Such an amendment should pass constitutional scrutiny because
there is a rational basis for distinguishing suppliers of transfusible blood
from manufacturers of blood products. 190 Protecting suppliers of trans-
187. The California Department of Health Services administers the Genetically Handi-
capped Persons Program, reimbursing hemophiliacs beyond the amount paid by individual
insurance, Medicare, or Medi-Cal. For reimbursement rates and procedures, see Letter from
Esmond S. Smith, M.D., Chief, California Children's Services (Nov. 13, 1985) (copy on file
with The Hastings Law Journal).
It can be argued further that the increase in the state's cost of subsidizing more expensive
blood products merely will be a shift from the state's current cost of subsidizing the treatment
of AIDS patients. The latter cost should decrease because exposing blood products manufac-
turers to strict liability will encourage them to ensure that there are fewer incidents of AIDS
contamination. See supra notes 171-74 & accompanying text.
188. 62 Cal. App. 3d 866, 133 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1976).
189. Id.
190. Like other economic regulations, the amended statute will carry a presumption of
constitutionality; to survive an equal protection challenge, the distinctions drawn by the stat-
ute must merely bear some rational relationship to a conceivable state purpose. See supra
notes 71-72 & accompanying text.
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fusible blood, such as hospitals and blood banks, from strict liability fos-
ters the state's interest in ensuring an adequate blood supply. Hospitals
and blood banks should be encouraged to provide this supply; blood
transfusions are imperative and have no substitute. The imposition of
strict liability would have a negative impact on the supply of transfusible
blood, which would result in poor patient care because transfusions are
often an integral part of a broad course of a patient's treatment. Thus,
the proposed amendment rationally relates to the state interest in pro-
moting an adequate supply of transfusible blood by immunizing hospitals
and blood banks from strict liability.
This state interest is not furthered by immunizing blood products
manufacturers, whose specialized products do not affect the general sup-
ply of transfusible blood. Such manufacturers are not in the business of
supplying transfusible blood to hospitals; they merely produce commer-
cial products for use by hemophiliacs. 191 Moreover, the manufacturers
obtain their supply of blood from paid donors. Thus, their source of
blood for clotting factor is independent of the voluntary donor system
used by hospitals and blood banks to collect transfusible blood. There-
fore, because commercial blood products manufacturers do not affect the
general blood supply, protecting those manufacturers from strict liability
neither promotes nor rationally relates to that legitimate state purpose.
To the extent that blood products manufacturers also are in the business
of supplying transfusible blood to hospitals, they can be immunized from
strict liability relative to such a service. The manufacture of blood prod-
ucts and placement into the stream of commerce is the transaction that
should be subjected to strict liability.
While the existing statute purports to promote the state's interest in
encouraging the manufacture of blood products, 192 this interest is out-
weighed by competing state interests. These interests include promoting
the safety of such products, spreading the financial burden of injuries
among all who use the product rather than resting it solely on the unfor-
tunate victim, and the interest in providing that victim with a realistic
avenue of legal relief. This latter interest is especially important in light
of the devastating impact of AIDS contamination. What was considered
a "relatively minor risk of hepatitis which the blood recipient must
take" 193 can no longer be considered minor when the risk of AIDS
means the risk of certain death.
191. The product at issue is a clotting agent, plasma protein, which is derived from blood.
In emergency shortages of blood at hospitals or blood banks, this product would not be called
upon to fill the shortage. The product is entirely different in character from blood used for
transfusion, and it is not a substitute for blood.
192. See Hyland Therapeutics v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. App. 3d 509, 516, 220 Cal.
Rptr. 590, 594 (1985).
193. McDonald v. Sacramento Medical Found. Blood Bank, 62 Cal. App. 3d 866, 873,
133 Cal. Rptr. 444, 448 (1976).
[Vol. 37THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
BLOOD PRODUCT EXEMPTION
Conclusion
Although section 1606 is silent on issues of civil liability, the statute
has been interpreted by California courts to preclude strict liability ac-
tions arising from both contaminated transfusible blood and blood prod-
ucts. Its application is justified in cases involving suppliers of
transfusible blood such as hospitals and blood banks because, by protect-
ing these entities from liability without fault, the state promotes its inter-
est in ensuring a plentiful supply of transfusible blood. Shielding blood
products manufacturers from strict liability, however, is not supported
by the same legitimate public policies as are applicable to hospitals and
blood banks. Subjecting blood products manufacturers to strict liability
will not decrease the availability of transfusible blood because blood
products are not substitutes for transfusible blood. Further, their manu-
facturing process involves an independent source of paid donors for
blood collection.
The existing statute's broad-sweeping and over-inclusive language
nevertheless has resulted in a safe harbor for blood products manufactur-
ers. Immunity from strict liability based on section 1606's mischaracter-
ization of blood products as a "service" has produced inequities to
victims of defective blood products, such as hemophiliacs. To alleviate
these inequities, the legislature should expressly exclude manufacturers
of blood products from strict liability immunity.
Expanding the doctrine of strict liability to include blood products
manufacturers will not expose such manufacturers to any greater burden
than that already imposed on most other manufacturers. 194 Further, the
availability of a remedy based on a theory of strict liability will in no way
assure victory for the plaintiff hemophiliac. It will merely lighten his
burden of proof in establishing the existence of a "defect" in the blood
product, a burden that often is too onerous when negligence is the only
allowable theory of recovery. The burden of proof will shift to the de-
l
194. Fogo did analogize blood products to drugs with dangerous side effects-penicillin
and cortisone-which are usually protected from strict liability by their classification as "un-
avoidably unsafe" products. See supra note 95 & accompanying text. As the Restatement of
Torts states, "because of lack of time and opportunity for sufficient medical experience, there
can be no assurance of safety, or perhaps even purity of ingredients, but such experience as
there is justifies the marketing and use of the drug notwithstanding a medically recognizable
risk." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment k (1965). It can be argued, how-
ever, that drugs and vaccines with potentially dangerous side effects are nevertheless pure,
while a blood product contaminated with hepatitis or AIDS is impure, thus defective. See
Boland, supra note 148, at 241-43. Moreover,
[i]f a product is so dangerous as to inflict widespread harm, it is ironic to exempt the
manufacturer from liability on the ground that any other sample of his product
would produce like harm. If we scrutinize deviations from a norm of safety as a basis
for imposing liability, should we not scrutinize all the more the product whose norm
is danger?
Traynor, supra note 8, at 368.
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fendant manufacturer, who will have an opportunity to establish the non-
existence of a defect under the risk-benefit test promulgated by Barker v.
Lull Engineering Co.
Although the risk of blood contamination has not been completely
eliminated, the incidence of contamination is greatly diminished by mod-
ern testing methods. As for the infrequent but inevitable accident, it is
more reasonable to place the weight of the burden of such an accident on
the blood products manufacturer than on its truly helpless victim.
Pamela T. Westfall*
* Member, Second Year Class.
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